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Abstract 
The UN has promoted the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) by national human 
rights institutions (NHRIs). This article critically examines this proposition by analysing the 
three assumptions that underlie it. First, that ADR is an appropriate means by which to 
resolve human rights disputes; second, that ADR should be provided in institutional form; 
third that an NHRI should play a role in the delivery of ADR. We argue that voluntary 
engagement with ADR is permissible subject to procedural and substantive standards of 
justice but identify the risk that the offer of ADR by an institution may turn into a de facto 
mandatory process if not set within a context in which the courts are also accessible. Rather 
than an outright rejection of a role for ADR in such circumstances, we examine the potential 
contributions an institution could make to redressing the deficiencies in access to justice 
landscape and identify the key factors states and other policymakers should take into account 
when determining which institution(s) assume a dispute resolution role. 
 
Introduction 
 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an umbrella term that captures a wide range of 
processes designed to resolve a dispute or complaint.1 It can refer to agreement-based dispute 
resolution (for example, conciliation, mediation and settlement negotiations) as well as 
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National Human Rights Institutions in Providing Access to Justice (41695) on which the authors of this article 
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their review and comments of this article. 
1 SUSAN BLAKE ET AL, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 5 
(2012). 
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processes such as arbitration where decisions are reached by third party decision-makers that 
are not courts. It can be used instead of, prior to, during or following litigation. ADR plays a 
prominent role in resolving disputes in many jurisdictions, particularly in areas such as 
commercial arbitration and family mediation.2 In Europe, the entry into force of the ADR 
Directive 3 , the Mediation Directive 4  and the Online Dispute Resolution Regulation 5  for 
consumer disputes has promoted the use of ADR further, including in jurisdictions in which 
ADR has not previously been used widely.  
 
An emerging area of analysis that has not yet received significant attention in the literature is 
the use of ADR to resolve human rights complaints.6 This is despite the use of ADR to deal 
with human rights complaints in practice. Agreement-based dispute resolution is regularly 
used, such as the friendly settlement system offered by regional human rights courts7; the 
settlement of human rights complaints at the national level 8 ; and the powers of some 
ombudspersons, national equality and human rights bodies to use settlement, conciliation or 
mediation.9 Similarly, human rights are included explicitly within the mandate of public 
sector ombudspersons. 10  In addition to using agreement-based dispute resolution, the 
                                                          
2 See, for example, country studies in KLAUS HOPF AND FELIX STEFFEK (eds), MEDIATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2013). 
3 Directive 2013/11 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No. 
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR), L 165/63.  
4 Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters (Mediation Directive), L 
136/3. 
5 EU Regulation 524/2013. 
6 Lorna McGregor, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Human Rights: Developing a Rights-Based Approach 
through the ECHR, 26(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 607 (2015) and EJIL Live! Interview available at: 
http://www.ejil.org/episode.php?episode=21  
7 HELEN KELLER ET AL, FRIENDLY SETTLEMENTS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2010); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 
1/2013, Reform of the Rules of Procedure, Policies and Practices, Revised Rules of Procedure (2013) at VI; 
Impact of the Friendly Settlement Procedure (2014). 
8 Examples of reported settlements include, ‘Compensation to Guantanamo Detainees was ‘Necessary’’ BBC 
News (16 November 2010) available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11769509; ‘Lieutenant-Colonel 
Nicholas Mercer says it is 'beyond question' that British soldiers tortured Iraqis’ Independent 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/lieutenant-colonel-nicholas-mercer-says-it-is-beyond-
question-that-british-soldiers-tortured-iraqis-a6803281.html; ‘Gold Mining Silcosis’ available at: 
https://www.leighday.co.uk/International-and-group-claims/Gold-mining-silicosis-(1)  
9 See, for example, the practice of the Australian Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Ombudsman of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the Netherlands College Voor de 
Rechten Van de Mens. 
10 LINDA REIF, THE OMBUDSMAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS SYSTEM (2004). See, Lorna McGregor, Rachel Murray, Shirley Shipman, Hélène Tyrrell, National 
Human Rights Institutions in Europe and Dispute Resolution: A Mapping (April 2017) available at: 
https://www.essex.ac.uk/hrc/practice/access-to-justice.aspx  (hereinafter NHRI and Dispute Resolution Mapping 
Report).We adopt the term ‘ombudsperson’ in this paper to reflect a gender-neutral formulation of the term. For 
further discussion on the use of the term see Varda Bondy and Margaret Doyle, ‘Manning’ the Ombuds 
Barricades UKAJI Blog (2015).  
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investigations and issuance of recommendations by ombudspersons could be characterised as 
a form of ADR for human rights complaints.11 Such characterisation will depend on whether 
the purpose of the investigation is aimed at securing a remedy for the complainant (in which 
case it may be a form of ADR) or only about addressing the underlying practice, policy or 
behaviour of the respondent (in which case it will not).12  
 
The United Nations (UN) and other international bodies have also promoted the use of ADR 
by National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs).13 NHRIs are defined as institutions with a 
mandate to promote and protect human rights and that have been awarded A, B, or C status 
by the UN International Coordinating Council (ICC) – or the Global Alliance of National 
Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) as it has recently been renamed.14 NHRIs take a range 
of forms including, ‘commissions; ombudsman institutes; hybrid institutions; consultative 
and advisory bodies; research institutes and centres; civil rights protectors; public defenders; 
and parliamentary advocates’ or a hybrid of one or more 15  (such as an equality body, 
traditional human rights commission and ombudsperson organised under an umbrella 
institution) which is common in Europe.16 The 2008 Nairobi Declaration adopted by the 
Ninth International Conference of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights recommends that NHRIs may ‘settl[e] the case through conciliation and 
mediation, thereby relieving the existing case-load of courts’ … as well as seeking ‘informal 
legal redress mechanisms through conciliation or through binding decisions’.17  
 
                                                          
11 Chris Gill and Carolyn Hirst, Defining Consumer Ombudsmen: A Report for Ombudsmen Services (2016); 
Nick O’Brien, What Future for the Ombudsman , POLITICAL QUARTERLY (2015); Richard Kirkham, The 
Ombudsman, Tribunals and Administrative Justice Sector: A 2020 Vision for the Ombudsman Sector 
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW 103 - 114 (2016). 
12 Meg Brodie, Uncomfortably Truths: Protecting the Independence of National Human Rights Institutions to 
Inquire 38 UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL 1215 (2015). 
13 United Nations OHCHR, National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities, 
Professional Training Series No 4, 93 (2010); Commonwealth Secretariat, Comparative Study on Mandates of 
National Human Rights Institutions in the Commonwealth 27 (2007); Ninth International Conference of 
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Nairobi, Kenya, 21-24 October 2008, 
The Nairobi Declaration (24 October 2008). 
14 The ICC was renamed GANHRI at the 29th General Meeting of the ICC in March 2016: 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/ICC/GeneralMeeting/29/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited 3 January 2017). As the ICC 
has only recently been renamed, we use the acronym ‘ICC/GANHRI’ in this article to avoid confusion. 
15 ICC, ICC SCA General Observations as adopted in Geneva in May 2013 (2013).  
16 Neil Crowther and Colm O’Cinneide, Bridging the Divide? Integrating The Functions of National Equality 
Bodies and National Human Rights Institutions in The European Union (2013). 
17 Nairobi Declaration supra note 12; see also, Commonwealth Secretariat, supra note 12 at 24; EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, Bringing Rights to Life: The Fundamental Rights Landscape of the European Union 9 
(2012). 
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The article draws on the findings of a project funded by the Nuffield Foundation which 
examined the role NHRIs within Europe18 already play in ADR and the reasons underpinning 
the lack of such a mandate for others. 19  Focusing on NHRIs enabled us to capture a 
manageable sample of bodies at the national level. However, there are many more institutions 
in Europe with a human rights mandate than those that have either A, B or C status with the 
ICC/GANHRI. This may be because their mandate is narrower, for example, an equality 
body that focuses on equality and non-discrimination rather than all forms of human rights20 
or an ombudsperson that handles human rights complaints but does not have a wider 
promotional mandate. While our research did not examine the practice of these bodies 
comprehensively, our findings are likely to be relevant to them. 
 
This article seeks to contribute to the emerging scholarship on ADR for human rights 
complaints by critically examining the proposition that NHRIs (or similar bodies at the 
national level such as equality bodies) should provide a form(s) of ADR. We do so through 
an analysis of three assumptions underlying the promotion of such a role. The first 
assumption is that the means by which human rights disputes are resolved can and should be 
wider than judicial resolution. In Part 1, we argue that the starting point for considering how a 
dispute should be resolved should be to establish the aim(s) of pursuing a complaint and 
whether courts and/or ADR processes are best suited to achieving that aim. In doing so, we 
caution against viewing ADR as a monolithic practice but rather suggest that it should be 
seen as an umbrella term to capture a wide range of processes with different characteristics 
and therefore different advantages and potential challenges for the resolution of human rights 
disputes. 
 
Within this assessment, one key distinction, in our view, is whether engagement with ADR is 
mandatory or voluntary. We suggest that a mandatory requirement to engage with ADR is 
likely to face challenges under international human rights law (IHRL). However, voluntary 
                                                          
18 The NHRIs were identified using the Directory of Institutions within Europe provided by the ICC/GANHRI - 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Contact/NHRIs/Pages/Europe.aspx and the member institutions listed on the European 
Network of NHRIs (ENNHRI) website - http://www.ennhri.org/List-of-members. The NHRIs included on these 
lists and their ICC/GANHRI accreditation status changed slightly over the course of the project, for example, 
where an NHRI was no longer accredited by the ICC/GANHRI. The GANHRI list includes 50 institutions, nine 
of which do not have an accreditation status listed. ENNHRI has 40 members, eight of which do not have 
ICC/GANHRI accreditation according to the ENNHRI website. 
19 See, NHRI and Dispute Resolution Mapping Report. 
20 EU Fundamental Rights Agency, National Human Rights Institutions in the EU Member States: 
Strengthening the Fundamental Rights Structure in the EU (Publications Office of the European Union 2010), 
11. Crowther and O’Cinneide, Bridging The Divide?id at 5. 
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engagement may be permissible and potentially advantageous to certain complainants or 
disputes, depending on the aim(s) of pursuing a complaint. purpose(s). However, even where 
an ADR process aligns with such aims, the process should embed procedural and substantive 
standards of justice. Consideration of what these standards should look like and embedding 
them in practice is only beginning to be addressed and, until resolved, may be a central 
limitation to the use of ADR for human rights complaints.   
 
The second assumption is that ADR should be provided in institutional form. In Part 2, we 
examine the advantages offered by the institutionalisation of ADR as well as the impact 
institutionalisation may have on the perceived voluntariness of engagement with the process, 
particularly in contexts in which the courts are difficult or too expensive to access. This may 
mean that ADR, as provided by an institution such as an NHRI, becomes the main means 
available for resolving human rights complaints rather than one of a number of options. This 
could be seen as transforming ADR from a voluntary into a de facto mandatory process 
which may be an unintended consequence of what otherwise might reflect an attempt to 
increase access to justice and pluralise the options for dealing with human rights complaints. 
Rather than an outright rejection of a role for ADR in such circumstances, we examine the 
potential contributions an institution could make to redressing the deficiencies in the access 
to justice landscape. 
 
The third assumption is that an NHRI or similar body should play a role in the delivery of this 
wider conception of access to justice which we assess in Part 3. This assumption raises 
questions about the purpose of such bodies and the best strategic use of their resources, often 
in a context in which they are expected to deliver a large number of functions with significant 
resource constraints. This article therefore addresses interconnected debates on access to 
justice and the institutional frameworks for the promotion and protection of human rights 
within a state that have received relatively little attention to date. It provides a framework and 
diagnostic tool for states, other policy makers, international organisations, NHRIs and similar 
bodies when considering whether to employ ADR for human rights disputes and whether to 
provide it in institutional form. 
 
1. Assessing the Compatibility of ADR with Human Rights Complaints 
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In order to assess the normative desirability of NHRIs and similar institutions playing a role 
in ADR, the baseline question of whether ADR is an appropriate way in which to deal with 
human rights complaints must be addressed. There are two dimensions to this question. The 
first dimension is whether IHRL permits the use of ADR to resolve human rights complaints. 
Even if considered permissible, the second dimension to the question is whether ADR is a 
desirable means by which to resolve human rights complaints. As ADR varies between and 
within each process, a simple or uniform answer to this question is not easily reached as it 
will depend on the complainant, the nature of the human rights violation, the characteristics 
of the particular ADR process and the objective(s) of resolving the dispute. Therefore, it is 
not possible to assert that all ADR processes are (un)desirable for resolving human rights 
disputes. Rather, in our view, each form of dispute resolution (including courts) needs to be 
assessed against the purpose(s) of pursuing a human rights complaint.  
 
1.1 Is ADR a Permissible Means to Resolve Human Rights Disputes? 
 
Two key issues affect the permissibility of ADR: first, the voluntariness of engagement with 
the process and second, the impact engagement with an ADR process has on the duty to 
investigate allegations of human rights violations, where applicable. 
 
1.1.1 Voluntariness of the Process 
 
Where engagement with the process is voluntary and results in a non-binding outcome 
(which is the case with agreement-based ADR and most investigations conducted by 
ombudspersons), IHRL is unlikely to prohibit engagement with ADR provided two 
conditions are met. First, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found that 
waiver of the right of access to a court is permissible provided the individual provides free 
and informed consent, no coercion or fraud is involved and the waiver is clear and 
unequivocal. 21  Second, where an institution, such as an ombudsperson, issues 
recommendations on a complaint, IHRL is also likely to require the independence and 
impartiality of that body. For example, the ECtHR has previously found that it may not be 
                                                          
21 See, McGregor, supra note 6 (discussing the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on these 
points). 
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possible to waive the right to an impartial tribunal.22 The general permissibility of voluntary 
engagement with ADR appears logical given that the complaint ultimately belongs to the 
complainant and, as discussed below, some complainants may wish to pursue a form of ADR 
as a first step, or instead of litigation, depending on their objectives in pursuing a complaint. 
 
By contrast, the position with mandatory requirements to engage with ADR may be different 
however. Mandatory ADR can take two forms: first, parties may be required to engage in the 
ADR process. In the case of agreement-based dispute resolution, they would retain the choice 
over whether or not to reach an agreement to resolve the dispute and the nature of that 
resolution. Where a decision is made by a third party, such as an ombudsperson, the decision 
would be non-binding on both parties or only binding on the respondent, meaning that the 
parties (or the complainant in the latter scenario) would retain the choice of whether to 
comply with the decision. The second form of mandatory ADR is where both engagement 
with the process and compliance with the findings of a third party decision-maker (such as an 
arbitrator) are required. In general, opposition to mandatory ADR underscores the absence of 
autonomy or consent of the parties as one of the main attributes of ADR. By extension, 
mandatory ADR would circumvent the right of access to a court as well as potentially 
undermine the public resolution of disputes with a public value, such as human rights, where 
confidentiality is part of the process (which as discussed below can apply to some but not all 
ADR processes).23 While these risks are most pronounced with the second form of mandatory 
ADR, scholars such as Genn argue that they may be as applicable in the first form where 
more subtle pressures to reach agreement or comply may apply.24  
 
For human rights violations specifically, the only source that addresses the mandatory use of 
ADR explicitly is the Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. It prohibits mandatory ADR even where 
the parties have control over the outcome, for example mandatory mediation.25 The question 
arises whether this prohibition might apply to human rights complaints more broadly. Two 
                                                          
22 See, Shirley Shipman, Waiver: Canute against the Tide, 32 CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 470 (2013) 
(discussing the relevant European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on the limitations to waiver). 
23 Examples of mandatory arbitration, for example, include consumer, housing and employment contracts in the 
US whereby a mandatory binding arbitration clause is written into the contract.  National Association of 
Consumer Advocates at http://www.consumeradvocates.org/for-consumers/arbitration accessed on 8 June 2017 
24 Hazel Genn, What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR and Access to Justice, 24 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW 
AND HUMANITIES 397, 404 (2012). 
25 Article 48(1). 
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possible interpretations are available in this respect. First, on a narrow reading, this 
prohibition might be interpreted to extend to all human rights violations involving an 
allegation of violence or criminality, such as torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, unlawful or arbitrary killings, enforced disappearance, 
slavery, servitude and trafficking in human beings. Second, the prohibition might also be read 
to extend to any human rights complaint where, by virtue of the (alleged) human rights 
violation, the complainant is perceived to be in a position of vulnerability. This interpretation 
aligns with critiques within the ADR literature of the use of mandatory ADR in cases where 
domestic violence has either been proven or alleged even if not the subject of the mediation 
process, on the grounds that the power imbalance between the parties may result in an unfair 
process and/or outcome.26  
 
What is less clear is whether the prohibition of mandatory ADR would extend to all forms of 
human rights complaints, particularly where parties retain some form of autonomy over the 
outcome. Both the Australian and Canadian Human Rights Commissions have a mandatory 
model of conciliation for discrimination complaints.27 In the UK, the Children and Families 
Act requires the consideration of mediation prior to bringing a claim before the Special 
Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal.28 Both examples are of mandatory requirements 
to engage in the process but are not mandatory in outcome. Presumably, the same arguments 
about vulnerability and perceived feelings of pressure to settle might apply to these models. 
However, further debate and analysis are needed to unpack where the lines between the 
permissibility and impermissibility of mandatory ADR with a voluntary outcome might be 
drawn. Only making a distinction based on the ‘seriousness’ of the complaint would appear 
too blunt and may risk a bifurcated approach to mandatory agreement-based processes that 
undermines the indivisibility of human rights. As discussed further below, other important 
factors may relate to the public importance of the underlying complaint and the extent to 
which power imbalances can be addressed within the process.   
                                                          
26 For example, see, Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women 100(6) YALE LAW 
JOURNAL 1545-1610 (1991); Leah Wing, Mediation and Inequality Reconsidered: Bringing the Discussion to 
the Table, 26(4) CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY 383-404 (2009); Linda Mulcahy, The Possibilities 
and Desirability of Mediator Neutrality: Towards an Ethic of Partiality, 10(4) SOCIAL AND LEGAL 
STUDIES 505-527 (2001); Richard Delgado et al, Fairness and Formality: Minimising the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 1359-1404 (1985). 
27 See, Complaints Page of Australian Human Rights Commission available at: 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaint-information and  ‘What Can I Expect’? Canadian Human Rights 
Commission, http://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/eng/content/what-can-i-expect (on the conciliation process) 
28 Section 55. 
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1.1.2. Impact on the Duty to Investigate 
 
The second issue on the permissibility of ADR for human rights disputes relates to how the 
duty to investigate, where applicable, is affected by engagement with ADR. Where 
allegations of serious or gross human rights violations such as torture, killings, enforced 
disappearance or trafficking in human beings are made, states are under an obligation to carry 
out a full and thorough investigation capable of identifying and punishing those responsible 
for the violation under IHRL.29 The question arises whether the complainant can agree that an 
investigation is not necessary through agreement-based ADR or whether an investigation by a 
body like an ombudsperson can fulfil the duty to investigate, thereby removing the 
requirement for the attorney general or state prosecutor to investigate. This question has not 
yet been addressed by an international or regional human rights tribunal. However, it is 
difficult to conceive how parties could agree to dispense with an investigation given that the 
duty to investigate is an independent procedural obligation on the state which presumably a 
complainant cannot unilaterally remove. In such a situation, the duty to investigate would not 
necessarily prevent the parties from attempting to resolve the civil dimension to the dispute, 
for example, by agreeing on an appropriate remedy and reparation for the victim and any 
wider policy or practice that required change. However, it seems unlikely that, such an 
agreement could override the state’s duty to investigate.   
 
The nature of the process as voluntary or mandatory and the impact on the duty to 
investigate, where applicable, set the baseline for the permissibility of ADR in relation to 
human rights claims. In our view, they are central points of departure for policymakers 
considering the use – and in particular, the institutionalisation – of ADR for human rights 
disputes. Provided these conditions are met, the next question is whether ADR processes 
constitute an appropriate or desirable means for resolving human rights claims. 
 
1.2 Is ADR a Desirable Means to Resolve Human Rights Disputes? 
 
                                                          
29 See Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras IACtHR Series C 4 (1988); 74/92, Commission Nationale des 
Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (11 October 
1995); and 245/02, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights (15 May 2006), at para 153; McCann and Others v United Kingdom Application No 18984/91, 
Merits and Just Satisfaction, European Court of Human Rights (27 September 1995), at para 161.  
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In this section, we identify the possible contributions of certain ADR processes to human 
rights and ask whether the concerns expressed about aspects of certain ADR processes can be 
overcome. 
 
1.2.1 Potential Contribution of ADR Processes to Dealing with Human Rights 
Complaints 
 
A number of possible objectives can be identified in relation to human rights claims. Under 
IHRL, where an individual has an arguable claim that his or her human rights have been 
violated, he or she has the right to access justice and, where a violation is found, to full and 
effective reparation. Like public international law more broadly, the primary form of 
reparation is restitution. However, since this is rarely fully achievable in relation to human 
rights claims, reparation also encompasses compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition.30 These five forms of reparation focus on justice and a remedy 
and reparation for the individual(s) affected. They also respond to wider objectives of 
accountability, public acknowledgment of wrongdoing and assurance that the violations will 
not be repeated. This may include holding individuals to account through criminal 
responsibility, where required, as well as a focus on how institutions and arms of the state 
operate and whether systemic or structural change is needed in order to ensure that violations 
are not repeated. It is often assumed that courts are the most appropriate forum for dealing 
with human rights claims. However, when set against these potential objectives, courts may 
not always be best placed or fully able to address all of the objectives, particularly guarantees 
of non-repetition. Therefore there may be a role for ADR, instead of, or in conjunction with 
the courts depending on the particular case. 
 
Some complainants may seek public acknowledgment of what happened to them by a third 
party neutral. The social status of courts may be important in this regard both for the 
complainant (having their ‘day in court’) as well as from a compliance perspective as certain 
respondents may only recognise court judgments. Equally, it may also be possible for bodies 
such as an arbitration tribunal or an ombudsperson to fulfil this function depending on the 
                                                          
30 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005. 
 11 
 
regard with which they are held.31 Other complainants, however, may not wish to go through 
the formality and unpredictability of litigation. 32  This may be particularly the case in 
situations such as torture in which the allegations have already been criminally investigated. 
In such cases, the complainant may prefer to use the results of the criminal investigation as 
the basis for a settlement negotiation or mediation. Others may wish to engage with the 
agency or alleged perpetrator, making conciliation or mediation a more attractive option. 
Parties may also be attracted to ADR processes, particularly agreement-based processes as 
they can provide parties with greater self-determination and autonomy,33 empowering them to 
shape and ‘control the outcome’.34 
 
The nature of the remedies available through the courts and ADR processes may also be 
relevant for the choice of process. The powers of many national courts may be limited to 
issuing declaratory judgments or compensation awards35 meaning that they cannot provide 
the full forms of reparation envisaged by the UN Basic Principles. By contrast, ADR 
processes may provide greater scope for securing tailored remedies on restitution (or partial 
restitution), rehabilitation and satisfaction through agreement-based processes as well as the 
findings of ombudspersons, depending on their mandate.36   
 
Agreement-based processes are often characterised as focused on the interests of the parties 
only.37 It may be difficult for individual mediators or conciliators or external mediators hired 
by an institution to identify wider issues represented by the complaint and thereby seek 
system change since they may not see patterns in complaints or have sufficient points of 
comparison.38 However, some scholars have challenged the proposition that ADR processes 
                                                          
31 Susan Sturm and Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 1 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 1, 47 (2007). 
32 Interview 60. Thomas Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW 
329 (2005). 
33 Isabelle Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, JOURNAL OF 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 55 (1995).  
34 Dominique Allen, Against Settlement? Owen Fiss, ADR and Australian Discrimination Law 10 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 191. 195 (2009).  
35 Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against (“Settlement” Not Included) 78 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 
1203, 1212 (2009); Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal 
Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs 141 UNIVERSITY OF PENNYSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 2169, 2239 
(1993). 
36 Interview 39; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic 
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases) 83 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 2663 (1995); Moffitt, id; 
Bernstein, id.  
37 Sturm and Gadlin, supra note 28 at 8. 
38 Id at 42. 
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are incapable of dealing with strategic issues, accountability and justice.39 Gadlin and Sturm, 
for example, argue that certain ADR processes counter the tendency to ‘segregate individual 
casework from systemic interventions aimed at addressing policy issues, examining recurring 
problems, or redesigning organizational systems’. They do so by integrating ‘systemic 
thinking into individual casework, and individual cases into the project of understanding and 
addressing systemic concerns’ through what they call ‘root cause analysis’.40 Gadlin and 
Sturm suggest that certain ADR processes can ‘produce systemic changes that adjudication 
cannot achieve, and can thus solve public problems and generate public values’. 41  In 
consumer dispute resolution, Hodges emphasises the role that ombudspersons play in 
providing advice and dispute resolution but also, if designed with systemic issues in mind, in 
aggregating data and feeding it back in order to ‘operat[e] as early warning and monitoring 
functions to support oversight by public regulatory enforcement bodies’.42 Institutions such as 
ombudspersons that offer a form(s) of ADR as a means of resolving a complaint may 
therefore be well-placed to identify systemic issues and address them through findings as 
well as securing a remedy for the individual.43 Indeed, annual reports by ombudspersons with 
human rights’ mandates often identify patterns in complaints on particular issues.44  
 
1.2.2 Concerns about ADR 
 
Notwithstanding the potential alignment of certain ADR processes with the purpose(s) of the 
pursuit of a human rights complaint, there may be resistance to the employment of some or 
all forms of ADR for human rights complaints both from the perspective of the complainant 
and the public-interest.  
 
For the complainant, the claims of self-determination, control and the ability to shape and 
devise creative remedies are often challenged. In agreement-based processes, commentators 
highlight the risk that the complainant is placed in a position of vulnerability with the 
                                                          
39 Thomas Shaffer and Andrew McThenia, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1660 (1984).  
40 Sturm and Gadlin supra note 28 at 4. 
41 Id  at 4. 
42 Chris Hodges, ‘Consumer Ombudsmen: Better Regulation and Dispute Resolution’ 15(4) JOURNAL OF 
ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 593 – 608  (2015) 
43 Id at 40. 
44 For example, Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015 Annual Report on 
the Results of the Activities of the Institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(March 2016). For illustration of this point, See, NHRI and Dispute Resolution Mapping Report. 
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potential that the process and/or the outcome may prove harmful or unfavourable to him or 
her.45  Power imbalance between the parties, which is particularly acute in human rights 
cases, lies at the heart of these concerns. Part of these concerns may relate to the resources 
that the more powerful party, such as a state or business, may be able to invest in the 
process.46 Subtler dynamics of power imbalance may also result in the complainant feeling 
compelled to settle out of concern that he or she will not be believed in court, regardless of 
the strength of the case or evidence.47 The perceived advantages of ADR processes will also 
be shaped by the responsiveness and willingness of the respondent to engage and comply 
with agreements and decisions and the types of conditions they attach to the process, such as 
confidentiality.  
 
While the literature is less well-developed on the risks to the complainant when complaints 
are handled by an ombudsperson, similar concerns may arise. The argument might be made 
that any inequality of arms or power imbalance is overcome by the involvement of the 
ombudsperson.48  However, concerns have been raised that once the complaint is made to the 
ombudsperson, the complainant may be left out of the process and therefore have no 
opportunity to influence or participate in the determination of remedies proposed either in 
settlement negotiations or a formal investigation.49 This may be particularly pronounced if 
the ombudsperson is required to act in the public interest, raising ‘interesting questions about 
who ‘owns’ the complaint and who decides whether they are satisfied with the proposed 
settlement’ or whether the complaint should still be investigated.50  This critique is layered on 
to the potential for a lack of transparency and openness in how the investigation is conducted 
and the nature of discussions with the respondent.51  
 
To the extent that the dispute resolution process is expected to contribute to accountability 
and justice for human rights violations, concerns may be raised where confidentiality or a 
                                                          
45 ROBERT A BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION; THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 13-15, 41-84 (2005). 
46 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1073, 1076 (1984). 
47 Noel Semple, Mandatory Family Mediation and the Settlement Mission: A Feminist Critique, 24 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW 207 (2012); Simon Roberts, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Civil Justice: An Unresolved Relationship, 56 MODERN LAW REVIEW 452, 462 (1993). 
48 TREVOR BUCK, RICHARD KIRKHAM & BRIAN THOMPSON, THE OMBUDSMAN ENTERPRISE 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 37 (2011). 
49 Id at 43. 
50 Margaret Doyle, Varda Bondy & Carolyn Hirst, The Use of Informal Resolution Approaches by Ombudsmen 
in the UK and Ireland: A Mapping Study 13 (2014). 
51 Richard Thomas, Jim Martin & Richard Kirkham, External Evaluation of the Local Government Ombudsman 
in England, 29 (2013). 
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lack of publicity attaches to the process. Agreement-based processes are typically 
confidential and therefore any admission of wrongdoing and the terms of the agreement will 
not be publicised unless both parties agree,52 leading to the argument that ADR undermines 
accountability and justice. 53  Where they are confidential, the Australian Human Rights 
Commission, for example, produces a case register of anonymised cases to demonstrate the 
types of cases they receive and how they are dealt with. 54  While the findings of an 
ombudsperson are not usually confidential, they are not always published, although the same 
point can be made about courts in many countries. 55 
  
Further concerns have been raised about the development of the law and jurisprudence 
through ADR processes. 56  For example, the mandatory inclusion of conciliation in the 
mandate of the Australian Human Rights Commission combined with the confidential nature 
of conciliation was originally critiqued for its impact on the development of discrimination 
law.57 Ombudspersons may be subject to similar criticisms in addition to the argument that 
they do not create precedent or certainty in the law in the same way as a judicial finding is 
meant to.58 Concerns are also raised about the extent to which agreement-based processes and 
ombudspersons take into account the law, including IHRL, 59  although this very much 
depends on the mandate, training and approach of the third party and practice of the 
ombudsperson. 
 
A failure to apply and develop the law is a significant risk, particularly where national courts 
do not have an established practice of engaging with IHRL in their judgments. This could 
have the dual result of a lack of clarity on behalf of ADR providers on the parameters of the 
law and stagnation in the development and implementation of IHRL at the national level. The 
                                                          
52 Article 7 European Mediation Directive (Directive 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and 
commercial matters); Article 17(4) ADR Directive (2013/11 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer 
disputes). Interviews 16, 17, 12, 21, 39, 60 and 63. 
53 Sturm and Gadlin supra note 28. 
54 Australian Human Rights Commission, Conciliation Register, available at: 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints/conciliation-register  
55 See, Lorna McGregor, Rachel Murray and Shirley Shipman, Developing Bespoke Standards of Justice for 
Ombudspersons Dealing with Human Rights Complaints forthcoming 2018. (equally noting that, a number of 
NHRIs, particularly ombudspersons, publish all or a selection of their decisions). 
56 Harry Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 668 
(1985). 
57 Allen, supra note 31.  
58 Richard Kirkham and Philip Wells, Evolving Standards in the Complaints Branch, 36(2) JOURNAL OF 
SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW, 190-207, 196 (2014). 
59 Richard Kirkham, Human Rights and the Ombudsmen – 2005-06, 30(1) JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
AND FAMILY LAW 75, 77 (2008). 
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implementation of economic, social and cultural rights is a good illustration of this point. 
While the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights is now well established in 
international law, many states have not changed their domestic practice to enable access to 
courts.60 Many of these claims are therefore typically dealt with by ombudspersons. While 
ombudspersons may provide an avenue for accessing justice where it is not otherwise 
available, the risk also arises that they do not identify the rights-dimension to such cases 
particularly where the relevant IHRL has not been implemented and embedded in domestic 
judicial practice, meaning that the claims may be treated as less serious than they are.61 
Equally, the converse may be true that in states in which the courts do not explicitly apply 
IHRL, it may be ombudspersons or similar bodies that ensure the protection of rights, 
particularly when they have an explicit human rights mandate. Therefore, generalisations 
cannot easily be made. 
 
1.2.3 Can the Concerns be Resolved? 
 
Acknowledging these critiques, it is necessary to assess whether they should be read to mean 
that the use of ADR processes for human rights complaints is prohibited; whether they are 
expressions of normative opposition to their use; or whether they make a claim on how ADR 
should operate in the human rights realm. Courts have not yet been called upon to determine 
whether ADR is compatible with remedies for alleged violations of IHRL. The practice of 
ADR is also diffuse and is not bound by a common set of standards or expectations. 
Moreover, there are very few empirical studies that establish whether ADR contributes 
positively to the goals of human rights dispute resolution in practice. However, given that 
ADR is already used to resolve human rights claims, continues to be promoted and, as 
already discussed, can offer particular advantages to complainants, it is important to develop 
responses to the critiques. Here we suggest that such responses should focus on substantive 
and procedural justice questions. 
 
The ECtHR requires that ADR is ‘attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its 
importance’.62 However, it has not clarified what these safeguards look like in human rights 
cases. At the moment, the general lack of procedural justice standards attached to agreement-
                                                          
60 MALCOLM LANGFORD ET AL (EDS), SOCIAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF 
COMPLIANCE: MAKING IT STICK (2017).   
61 Edwards, supra note 53 at 679. 
62 ECtHR Osmo Suovaniemi and others v. Finland Appl. 31737/96 (Judgment of 23 February 1999). 
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based processes and complaints-handling by ombudspersons means that there is the potential 
for significant variations in the quality of justice in process and outcome. As set out above, 
serious risks can arise for complainants in ADR cases which are particularly acute when 
dealing with human rights. In certain situations, this will mean that ADR is unsuitable, even 
if voluntary, although the lines and guidance on how to make such a determination are 
unclear. In other situations, the way in which the ADR process is structured and conducted 
may mitigate these risks, enabling the complainant to access the opportunities and attributes 
of certain ADR processes. As noted above, an ADR process in which the provider (such as an 
ombudsperson) can investigate the complaint may remove some of the power imbalance as 
the complainant will be in a stronger negotiating position following an investigation on the 
facts.63 The role of the ADR provider may also be critical in identifying and addressing any 
signs of power imbalance. Much more analysis is needed, therefore, into the standards of 
justice in ADR without conflating ADR processes with each other or with courts. Such 
analysis should include whether existing standards within IHRL, such as procedural justice 
and equality of arms, can be tailored and adapted for ADR processes without making them 
slower or more expensive than they should be as such an approach would risk undermining 
the ADR process completely. 
 
In a separate article, we analyse the standards of justice needed in greater depth and propose 
frameworks for agreement-based processes and for ombudspersons. Our proposals do not 
attempt to conflate ADR processes with each other or with courts. Rather, they seek to 
identify existing standards within IHRL such as procedural justice and equality of arms and 
assess the extent to which they can be tailored and adapted for ADR processes without 
making them slower or more expensive than they should be as such an approach would risk 
undermining the ADR process completely.64  
 
Beyond process standards, a significant gap in research that requires attention is the 
substantive requirements of ADR in addressing concerns of accountability and justice. The 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has found that in any settlement, 
conciliation or mediation agreement, the public interest should be reflected. It distinguishes 
between ‘early resolution’ and ADR once the institution has conducted some form of 
                                                          
63 Buck, Kirkham and Thompson supra note 45 at 37 (citing O’Brien). 
64 For a more detailed discussion of the standards required, see Shirley Shipman, Lorna McGregor and Rachel 
Murray, ‘Human Rights Claims, Power Imbalances and Standards of Justice for Agreement-Based Dispute 
Resolution’ forthcoming Civil Justice Quarterly. 
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investigation. ‘Early resolution’ is characterised as a situation where no investigation into the 
allegations has taken place and the dispute resolution process may therefore focus only on the 
interests or needs of the parties. By contrast, once an investigation has taken place and the 
institution has ‘amassed evidence, and will have some basis for taking a position on the 
strength of the allegation and, consequently, a rights-based perspective that is informed by 
the evidence and that determines the public interest at stake. To adopt a purely interest-based 
approach in those circumstances would be to ignore the evidence at hand.’65 However, it does 
not clearly define what the public interest means in such circumstances and how it is 
incorporated into the recommendation or settlement agreement. This may vary depending on 
the nature of the dispute resolution process. For example, a private settlement negotiation 
may be subject to different standards and demands than a human rights ombudsperson. 
 
In short, at least in relation to voluntary engagement with ADR processes, there does not 
appear to be a prohibition on the use of ADR, provided it is not used as a means to evade the 
obligation to carry out a criminal investigation into the complaint, where applicable. 
Moreover, in some cases, ADR may be preferable to the complainant and provide greater 
opportunities for the construction of creative and tailored remedies that potentially are able to 
identify and address systemic human rights problems. However, even where ADR is 
considered to offer advantages for the complainant, effective procedures and safeguards will 
have to be in place to redress any power imbalances and to protect the complainant in both 
the process and outcome.  
 
2. Institutionalising ADR  
 
Having determined the permissibility of voluntary engagement with ADR for human rights 
complaints in certain situations subject to the conditions set out in Part 1, the next question is 
whether ADR processes should be offered in institutional form as has been recommended by 
bodies such as the UN. A specialised institution may not be necessary for all forms of ADR 
as legal representatives can, in theory, carry out settlement negotiations. In most, if not all, 
jurisdictions, some mediation and conciliation services may be available, even if not 
specialised in human rights. Equally, institutionalising agreement-based dispute resolution 
may have certain advantages, such as increasing awareness and accessibility to ADR 
                                                          
65 OHCHR report, supra note 12 at 93. 
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processes; and the risks and current lack of uniform practice on substantive and procedural 
standards of justice may be more easily addressed within an institution. This is both because 
of the ability to concentrate expertise and develop experience and standards within an 
institution as well as the public engagement and critique such an institution is likely to attract. 
Scrutiny from external actors may improve the quality of justice provided, at least in healthy 
institutions that are reflective, self-critical and open to outside monitoring and assessment. 
For other forms, ADR will only be accessible through an institution, for example, an 
ombudsperson-style investigation or a quasi-judicial body. Moreover, if the purpose(s) of 
resolving a particular dispute extend to addressing systemic practices, changing behaviours 
and guaranteeing non-repetition, an institutional approach will be important in order to 
identify and address wider human rights issues. 
 
At the same time, a decision to vest an institution with an ADR mandate for human rights 
complaints is not necessarily neutral or solely about increasing accessibility and optionality in 
dispute resolution. Even if not intended, it is likely to have the effect of promoting and 
centralising the form(s) of ADR as a key means to resolve human rights disputes. This is 
potentially to a greater degree than would have been the case if the availability of the form(s) 
of ADR was dependent on engagement by individual complainants and their legal advisors or 
representatives. The institutionalisation of ADR for human rights complaints could therefore 
involve a shift from recognition of the permissibility of voluntary engagement of ADR for 
human rights complaints in certain circumstances, to normative promotion of that form(s) of 
ADR as a central means of resolving human rights complaints. In this part of the article, we 
first assess these risks before proposing ways in which they might be mitigated in order for 
the institutionalisation of ADR to contribute to an enhancement and pluralisation of access to 
justice in human rights cases. 
 
2.1 From Optionality to Mainstreaming: Risk of Transformation into Quasi-
Mandatory 
 
The perceived voluntariness of ADR will be affected by how accessible the courts are. In an 
ideal world, individuals with human rights complaints would be able to access free legal 
advice and then legal aid for adjudication or ADR in order to ensure that they had a choice of 
the route most appropriate and suited to their needs and the nature of the complaint. 
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However, the reality is that an institution with an ADR mandate is likely to function within 
an environment in which the availability of legal aid is limited, particularly in the civil and 
administrative justice spheres. In such a context, the lack of legal aid may be a key barrier to 
complainants who wish to bring a claim for an alleged violation of a human right before the 
courts or seek judicial review of a decision of the executive that affects their rights. It may 
also mean that access to legal aid is only available for certain types of violations, such as 
torture, but not a housing complaint thus creating a division in access to justice that is 
contrary to the universality and indivisibility of human rights. 66  Without legal aid, 
complainants may only be able to access the courts if they can self-represent; if law firms 
offer no-win, no-fee arrangements; or if an organisation such as a non-governmental 
organisation or NHRI has capacity to carry out strategic litigation and views the claim as 
raising a wider issue that if successfully challenged, would lead to a change in law, policy or 
practice and thus benefit a wider group within society. 
 
If an institutionalised form(s) of ADR is introduced or available in such a context – even if 
voluntary on its face – it may be seen as the main vehicle to access justice, particularly if 
free67, and thus become the norm rather than an option suitable for some but not necessarily 
all human rights complaints or complainants, turning it into a de facto mandatory process. 
While ADR may have particular attributes such as creativity in remedies, where it is the only 
real avenue to pursue a complaint in practice, these features may be diminished. ADR may 
then be seen as the cheaper but lesser dispute resolution option thereby appearing to create a 
two-tier system based on affordability.  
 
Institutions with an ADR mandate therefore need to be aware of their potential impact on the 
wider dispute resolution landscape. In this type of context uptake will not solely be decided 
on the basis that the process is the most suitable for the complainant, alignment with the 
aim(s) of pursuing a human rights complaint and the type of dispute at issue. Institutions such 
as NHRIs should approach its incorporation with a mind to the possibility of ADR ‘creep’ 
and the need to make conscious decisions about whether the form(s) of ADR should develop 
into a central means to resolve human rights complaints. This is particularly the case as the 
institutionalisation of ADR may open the way for policymakers to later view the increased 
use of ADR (driven by the relative accessibility of courts and availability of legal aid) as an 
                                                          
66 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, On ‘Indivisibility’ of Human Rights, 14(2) EUR. J. INT’L L 381 (2003).  
67 Interviewee 60. 
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opportunity to convert a voluntary system into a mandatory system by first requiring parties 
to try to resolve the complaint through the ADR process before or instead of bringing a 
complaint before the court or being eligible for legal aid. It could also eclipse efforts to 
address shortcomings in funding for access to justice through other routes and detract from or 
ossify wider efforts to reform the legal system.68 
 
2.2 Mitigating the Risks  
 
In response to these risks, one option might be to reject the institutionalisation of ADR for 
human rights related disputes on the grounds that it is likely to become the main form of 
dispute resolution, even if voluntary, particularly in the face of legal aid cuts. The problem 
with this approach is that it means that many complainants may have no means to access any 
form of justice and some claims may be suited to the ADR process, as already noted. 
 
An alternative approach may be to examine how the institution might both fill a gap in the 
access to justice landscape but equally develop an evidence base for the need for other types 
of processes for accessing justice, where lacking, and increased legal aid, either separately or 
through vesting the institution with additional powers.69 For example, in its 2015 annual 
report, the Macedonian NHRI (an ombudsperson) noted that ‘[s]ome of the citizens, although 
informed of the fact that the Ombudsman is not competent to act, due to their material 
position, and the impossibility to engage a lawyer, are still addressing the Ombudsman. 
Having this situation in mind, the Ombudsman repeated the position from last year, that is, 
recommended the strengthening of the system for free-of-charge legal assistance’.70 Thus, the 
approach would be to analyse and document complaints received that the institution considers 
inappropriate for treatment through the form of ADR offered and where no other way to 
access justice exists. In taking such an approach the institution would need a database and 
system for analysing the complaints it receives as well as external evaluations to assess the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of the ADR process for human rights. 
 
                                                          
68 HAZEL GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE (2010). 
69 The importance of this type of approach is illustrated by Article 31 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities which requires states to ‘collect appropriate information, including statistical and 
research data to give effect to the present Convention’. 
70 Republic of Macedonia Ombudsman, Annual Report on the Degree of Provision, Respect, Advancement and 
Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, 2015 (2016) at 139. 
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In carrying out such an assessment, the first level of analysis would be to document whether 
or not the institution deems the complaint admissible. Many ombudspersons provide statistics 
on the number of complaints they reject.71 Within this context, a key issue would be to assess 
whether the complaint concerned human rights and if another mechanism or process exists 
through which the claimant could seek redress. Where another mechanism does not exist, this 
would provide evidence of an access to justice gap. Equally, the scale of work involved and 
significant resources required is important to note as discussed later. 
 
A second level of analysis would be to assess whether the particular form of ADR is 
appropriate to resolve the particular human rights claim. For example, an institution with a 
mediation function may find that the form of ADR it offers is not suitable for certain types of 
claims, for certain complainants, where cases are particularly complex or the law uncertain or 
where the purpose(s) of pursuing a complaint relate to guarantees of non-repetition or 
systemic change. Similarly, the investigatory powers of an ombudsperson may be suitable for 
dealing with certain types of human rights complaints but not others depending on its 
resources, approach to investigation and powers. The governing statutes of some 
ombudspersons suggest that certain types of complaints should only be dealt with by a court 
although not all provide a clear indication of which types of complaints would fall within this 
category even if these types of determinations are made in practice72. The legislation of the 
Human Rights Defender (an NHRI) in Armenia provides that, ‘[t]he Defender shall not 
consider those complaints that must be settled only by Court73 … the Defender shall by his 
own initiative make a discretionary decision about accepting the issue for consideration, 
particularly in cases when there is information on mass violations of human rights and 
freedoms, or if these violations have exceptional public significance or are connected with the 
necessity to protect the rights of such persons who are unable to use their legal remedies’.74 
 
Where the institution deems that its ADR functions are not appropriate for dealing with the 
particular type of human rights complaint, the institution may be able to map whether another 
means of accessing justice exists as well as propose the types of processes that it deems 
suitable for the type of complaint at issue. Such an approach may strengthen the case for 
                                                          
71 See for example, 2015 Annual Report on the Results of the Activities of the Institution of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2016) at 145. 
72 Interview 118. 
73 Article 10 of The Law of the Republic of Armenia on the Human Rights. 
74 Id.  
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enhancing legal aid as well as support the proposition that other forms of ADR are also 
needed. For example, an institution with a mandate to offer conciliation might make the case 
for a mandate to carry out ombudsperson-style investigations in order to enhance its fact-
finding capacity. Vice versa, an ombudsperson may make the case for more formal 
agreement-based ADR powers in order to try to resolve cases prior to initiating a formal 
investigation. Both might also make the case for litigation powers where cases are not 
successful or for other institutions to which cases appropriate for litigation might be referred.  
 
This type of approach would also enable the institution to evidence the areas in which the 
development of the law stagnates as well as identify cases that would serve as test cases and 
any that could not be taken forward due to a deficit in legal aid. The institution could also 
document the options for enforcing agreements or recommendations issued by 
ombudspersons as well as to judicially review the decisions of the ADR process itself. 
Provision for judicial review is of key importance to warrant against the risk that some 
ombudspersons might decide not to take up cases which they see as politically sensitive.75  
 
As far as we are aware, where ADR is already available in institutionalised form for human 
rights complaints (such as within an NHRI or an ombudsperson with an explicit human rights 
mandate), the type of documentation and monitoring we envisage here is not routinely carried 
out. It is particularly challenging as it requires a reflexive approach and for institutions to 
identify their own limitations. It would also require significant resource and a sophisticated 
assessment of the types of claims and complainants suitable to particular processes that did 
not revert to reductive assumptions that low value claims or ones involving certain economic, 
social or cultural rights are appropriate for ADR whereas civil and political rights are not. 
 
These risks and limitations notwithstanding, such empirical evidence would be 
transformational in establishing and evidencing the strengths and advantages of 
institutionalised ADR in certain cases for human rights complaints as well as establishing the 
boundaries and limitations and where legal aid for litigation is critical. It would thus focus on 
mitigating ADR being considered a second-best option for access to justice in climates 
                                                          
75 ROBERTO GARGARELLA ET AL, COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? (2006). 
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without adequate legal aid provision while opening up the possibilities for access to justice 
and a more plural and fuller dispute resolution environment. 
 
Where institutionalised ADR is identified as a potential means of addressing gaps and 
deficiencies in access to justice for human rights complaints, a detailed and forward-looking 
impact assessment will be needed to determine the impact the ADR process – even if 
voluntary – might have on the wider access to justice landscape in order to determine whether 
this is normatively desirable. We would suggest that this type of assessment might also be 
carried out where institutions already provide a form of ADR to assess the effectiveness of 
the process and how it connects to other means of accessing justice within a state, including 
the courts. These questions will involve many of the issues discussed above on whether ADR 
is permissible but assume a different tone and focus when asked in relation to normative 
promotion and the impact on the wider access to justice landscape.    
 
3. Which Institution Should be Vested with an ADR Function? 
 
Provided the issues identified in Parts 1 and 2 can be addressed, the final point for 
consideration is which institution should be vested with an ADR function for human rights 
complaints. As already noted, a role for NHRIs in complaints-handling (including but not 
limited to ADR) is envisaged but not required by the Paris Principles.76 Bodies such as the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the ICC/GANHRI have 
subsequently promoted such a role for NHRIs as part of their mandate to protect human 
rights and many NHRIs offer some form of ADR. At the same time, NHRIs take many 
different forms and other institutions may exist that could offer ADR for human rights 
complaints, making the identification of the appropriate institution more complicated than 
may initially appear. In the final part of this article, we identify key factors to take into 
account when assessing the optimal institution to offer ADR for human rights complaints. 
 
3.1 Focusing on the Most Effective Institution to Provide ADR 
 
                                                          
76 Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions UNGA Res 48/134, UN Doc.A/RES/48/134 (1993); 
See, also Rachel Murray, National human Rights Institutions: Criteria and Factors for Assessing their 
Effectiveness, 25(2) NETHERLANDS QUARTERLY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 189, 201 (2007). See also 
ICC/GANHRI, General Observation 1.10, supra note 14. 
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In the majority of jurisdictions, it is likely that one or more institutions already exists that 
provides – or could provide – ADR for human rights. In Europe, in particular, which was the 
focus of our study, one interviewee noted that multiple services and agencies may already 
exist, meaning that ‘you are already dealing with contexts that are so dense in terms of 
existing frameworks that [NHRIs] are de facto constrained as to the kind of space that they 
can occupy’.77 This can lead to the assumption that as institutions already exist that could 
deal with complaints, they should handle human rights complaints. Such institutions include 
ombudspersons, inspectorates, state agencies and civil society organisations offering advice, 
representation and/or direct ways in which to resolve complaints as well as specialised human 
rights bodies such as equality bodies and children’s commissioners.78  Indeed, within the 
course of our research, a number of NHRIs noted that they had not been vested with a dispute 
resolution mandate as that would have meant overlap with the ombudsperson.79  
 
 
Equally, some NHRIs are also ombudspersons but may not have other ADR functions such as 
mediation or are also equality bodies with an existing ADR process for discrimination 
complaints, for example. Therefore, they may be part of an assessment of whether their 
mandate should be expanded. There are important reasons why expansion of the mandate of 
an existing institution should be considered. For example, if there is already a body, such as 
an ombudsperson, with an ADR function, there may be a risk that a specialist human rights 
body duplicates its work and creates confusion for individuals seeking to lodge a complaint.80 
On this view, the focus should be on avoiding multiple points of entry for complaints in order 
to offer a consistent and coherent approach and prevent complaints falling through the gaps. 
 
However, even where another institution with an ADR function exists that could or already 
deals with certain types of human rights complaints, the assumption should not automatically 
be made that it is best placed to do so. Rather, the focus, in our view, should be on ensuring 
that the institution(s) that can provide the most effective means for resolving human rights 
complaints, including addressing the provisos made in Parts 1 and 2 of this article, have an 
                                                          
77 Interview 9; Interview 54. 
78 Crowther and O’Cinneide supra note 15 at ii. Peter Rosenblum, Tainted Origins and Outcomes, in RYAN 
GOODMAN AND THOMAS PEGRAM, HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE: ASSESSING NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 322 (2012).  
79 Interviews 4 and 5; Interview 55; Interview 23. Expert Meeting on the Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Providing Access to Justice, 21 September 2015, Wivenhoe House Hotel, University of Essex 
80 Interview 53.  
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ADR mandate for human rights complaints. As one interviewee within our research noted, 
the risk is that in states with relatively well functioning judicial systems, policy-makers may 
only focus on what is formally available rather than effectiveness in practice.81 However, 
even in situations in which options for accessing justice appear to be available, they may not 
be as complete or as effective as one might initially assume and there may be gaps.  
 
Part of this assessment will involve analysis of the quality of justice provided by existing 
institutions and, where deficiencies exist, whether it is better to try to strengthen the quality 
of justice within existing institutions or create a new service. A key issue within this analysis 
is whether the complaint is explicitly dealt with as a human rights complaint by, for example, 
using IHRL to assess and guide the resolution of the complaint as well as ensuring that 
substantive and procedural justice standards developed for the particular form of ADR are in 
place.82 This type of assessment does not appear to be regularly undertaken - and was one of 
the hardest issues on which to collect data in our research - but is critical if ADR is to offer a 
form of effective remedy for human rights complaints. 
 
3.2 The Preferred Location within a Body Expert in Human Rights 
 
Given the lack of consistency and practice on ADR generally and its relative youth in dealing 
with human rights complaints, there are particular reasons that a body with a human rights 
mandate might be preferred. The most obvious point is that a body such as an NHRI is likely 
to have substantial expertise in IHRL and thus be able to assess the extent to which 
settlements, recommendations and forms of reparation comply with IHRL.83 One might also 
assume that an NHRI would incorporate or be open to developing substantive and procedural 
standards of justice and adopt a human rights-based approach to the ADR process84 thus 
responding to some of the risks identified in Parts 1 and 2 of this article. 
 
                                                          
81 Interviews 9; 43.  
82 See Part 1 of this article.   
83 UN Principles supra note 27. 
84 Scottish Human Rights Commission, PANEL Principles available at: http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/in-
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Ombudsman and Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Manual (2016). See, Lorna 
McGregor, Rachel Murray and Shirley Shipman, ‘First Contact with Complainants: A Human Rights Based 
Approach to Triage and Referrals by NHRIs’ (April 2017). 
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If well-known and trusted, NHRIs and related bodies may also be in a strong position to 
reach persons in positions of vulnerability or hard-to-reach sections of the community,85 
particularly by playing a mediating role between minorities and the state with regard to 
access to state services in situations where there may be a ‘a level of distrust between 
members of the population [such as minorities facing longer-term disenfranchisement] and 
state bodies, this is where NHRIs and ombuds offices can be really the only possible body 
where you can have an interface with certain sections of the population’.86 
 
NHRIs may also be well-placed to address concerns about the public interest, accountability 
and guarantees of non-repetition addressed in Part 1, particularly where they have a strong 
link between complaints-handling (which may include ADR but also encompass advice, 
assistance and representation) and documentation and reporting on patterns of human rights 
violations. Within our research, interviewees noted that complaints-handling (including 
ADR) could feed into the strategic human rights work undertaken by NHRIs and enable them 
to identify trends and groundswells. It would also provide a means to identify underreporting 
on issues on which one might expect to receive complaints which could then be investigated 
and outreach conducted by the NHRI.   
 
However, there is a risk that complaints-handling does not feed into systemic issues. One 
participant at the expert meeting we convened as part of this research noted that in his 
experience, complaints mechanisms may not be particularly helpful in addressing systemic 
issues.87 Where this occurs, it may be due to a lack of process internally to analyse the nature 
of complaints and the extent to which they are indicative of human rights concerns in the 
state and/or low levels of complaints from certain groups or sections of society as well as 
resource constraints and inadequate funding. Indeed, the complaints-handling function of an 
NHRI can often be quite separate from its wider promotional and protection work. In this 
respect, where an NHRI has an ADR function, it is critical that it puts a system in place to 
analyse complaints and complainants.  
 
                                                          
85 Obiora Okafor and Shedrack Agbakwa, On Legalism’. Legalism, Popular Agency and "Voices of Suffering": 
The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission in Context, 24(3) HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 662, 
695 (2002). 
86 Interviews 4 and 5.  
87 Expert meeting supra note 79. 
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From an institutional perspective, the adoption of at least some form of complaints-handling 
may enhance the perception of the accessibility and relevance of an NHRI, particularly with 
the general public thus providing institutional benefits.88 Equally, it might be argued that 
other means of enhancing such perceptions exist, for example through national consultations, 
advocacy work and thematic inquiries. The extent to which other functions have the same 
impact in terms of increasing the credibility and visibility of an NHRI is difficult to measure 
and will depend in part on the context in a specific jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the ability of 
individual members of the public to approach an NHRI with a complaint and potentially have 
that complaint investigated and/or for the NHRI to try to find a solution to resolve the case 
has been cited as an important element in determining the effectiveness of an NHRI.89 
 
3.3 Challenges for NHRIs Playing a Role in ADR  
 
Even though a body with human rights expertise may appear to present the optimal institution 
to vest with an ADR function, there are a number of challenges to an NHRI or similar body 
playing such a role that also merit consideration and again depend to a large extent on the 
type of NHRI concerned and its existing powers. For example, an NHRI that is also an 
ombudsperson raises very different questions about ADR to a traditional human rights 
commission with no existing ADR (but potentially advice, assistance or representational) 
role. In this final part, we identify the type of challenges that can arise for NHRIs assuming 
an ADR (or complaints-handling) function. 
 
3.3.1 Dividing complaints 
 
First, human rights bodies are only likely to be vested with a mandate to deal with the human 
rights dimensions of the complaint unless they are organised within an umbrella body with a 
wider subject-matter jurisdiction such as an ombudsperson.90 In some cases, this will not 
raise any issues. However, there may be dimensions to the complaint beyond human rights 
rendering it necessary to split the complaint between two bodies. For example, the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission can only deal with complaints on discrimination.91  Where it 
                                                          
88 Interview 2. 
89 Commonwealth Secretariat, supra note 12 at 3. 
90 This will not be the case with all NHRIs. For example, some NHRIs that are also ombudspersons can deal 
with the wider dimensions to the complaint and not just the human rights aspects. 
91 Canadian Human Rights Act, Part III. 
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receives a complaint that raises issues beyond its subject-matter jurisdiction, it has to refer 
these aspects to another body.  
 
3.3.2 The Compatibility of the Promotional and Regulator Function 
 
Second, some interviewees argued that an NHRI with an ADR function must act with 
neutrality in fairness to both sides to the dispute.92 Interviewees questioned whether an ADR 
function produces a tension – and possible conflict – between an NHRI’s mandate to promote 
human rights (which they argue necessarily requires it to act as an advocate) and the need to 
preserve a position of neutrality in dispute resolution. 93  One NHRI noted that ‘even if 
mediation would be mentioned in the law, it would be difficult to envisage how this would be 
done in practice since the people in our office are not necessarily considered as neutral. The 
office is considered as a ‘saviour’ by the people’.94 Another interviewee from an NHRI noted 
that it ‘constantly struggle[s]’ with this issue as ‘every time a respondent comes to us, they 
will think that we already have a view on the complaint’.95 One interviewee noted that the 
tension would not arise where the NHRI provides advice, triage or represents individuals in 
ADR processes or before courts as these functions would align with the promotion and 
protection of human rights96. This concern is echoed in a study of equality bodies within 
Europe. Crowther and O’Cinneide note that ‘integrated bodies [meaning bodies that have a 
dual mandate such as an ombudsperson and NHRI] can also face particular difficulties in 
circumstances where they are expected to function both as an active and engaged agent of 
social transformation and as an enforcement and regulatory agency charged with securing 
compliance with established equality and human rights standards'.97  
 
The tension is not necessarily insurmountable but requires assessment and management and 
may speak in favour of an NHRI working with another body to develop its ADR capacity in a 
human-rights compliant manner rather than assuming it itself. One interviewee noted that the 
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management of firewalls between the promotional work and the complaints-resolution 
functions would be particularly important as well as solutions such as outsourcing support to 
complainants within the dispute resolution process in order to avoid perceptions of bias.98  
 
3.3.3 Capacity Concerns and the ‘Strategic’ Function of Complaints 
 
Third, embedding an ADR function within an NHRI raises concerns about the range of 
activities NHRIs are expected to undertake. The Paris Principles and the ICC/GANHRI 
suggest a wide range of functions for an NHRI which they are increasingly called upon to 
deliver, including acting as the National Prevention Mechanism under the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention against Torture and independent mechanism under Article 33 of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This approach puts NHRIs at risk of 
assuming - or being required to assume - multiple functions with the result that they are 
spread too thin. As one interviewee noted, ‘the increasing demand on NHRIs is a mirror of 
multitude of challenges that countries are facing, that have to do with poverty, with human 
rights, violence’.99 In such situations, there may be concerns about an NHRI assuming or 
expanding an existing ADR function, unless the state invests additional resources to enable 
the NHRI to effectively provide such services. Indeed, it is important to recognise the 
significant resources needed for quality and effective dispute resolution on a large scale 
which increases further if thematic and systemic analysis of complaints and behavioural 
change is also built in.  
 
Within this context, commentators and a number of interviewees within the course of our 
research questioned whether an ADR function or individual complaints-handling more 
generally consumes too many resources and distracts from more strategic ways of working 
directed at addressing the causes or consequences of human rights violations and systemic 
human rights issues.100 This line of analysis led the Scottish Parliament to ‘decide[] that it 
would be better for our [the Scottish Human Rights Commission’s] limited resources to be 
used for working on strategic legal and policy work, instead of providing an advice service. 
                                                          
98 Interview 43. 
99 Interviews 4; 5.  
100 Interviews 6, 50, 65. David S. Meyer, NHRIs, Opportunities, and Activism, in GOODMAN AND PEGRAM 
supra note 73. 
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This means that we work on human rights issues that affect lots of people, rather than 
providing advice to a smaller number of individuals’.101  
 
Some interviewees also noted that dealing with individual cases (including ADR) may not 
always be the most effective way in which to address major human rights issues. They noted 
that problems with underreporting may also mean that the complaints made to an NHRI do 
not always reflect the most pressing issues and that the NHRI is also likely to receive 
complaints that would not be framed as human rights violations as well as complaints that 
would have to be referred elsewhere (such as relating to family law).102 Some interviewees 
made this point even in relation to ombudspersons, some of which are now considering 
whether the processing of individual cases should be replaced or balanced with the 
introduction or greater use of own-initiatives powers that seek to have a wider impact beyond 
the individual case103 particularly as many ombudspersons are required to investigate all 
admissible complaints they receive. 
 
By contrast, one interviewee suggested that an emphasis on strategic litigation can ‘be an 
excuse to not deal with all the cases, then complainants have nowhere to go’. The interviewee 
argued that, ‘it is important to have a critical mass of casework [and not] assume that there 
are other places to go as NGOs may be strapped and courts can be deeply inaccessible’.104 
Another NHRI (ombudsperson) noted that the handling of individual complaints (which can 
encompass ADR but also advice, assistance and representation) is the ‘core function if not the 
only function of the institution’.105 In addition, there is a challenge for an NHRI with an ADR 
or wider complaints-handling function of how to balance its role in identifying and focusing 
on systemic issues and being perceived as accessible to members of the public on the one 
hand with, on the other, avoiding being overwhelmed by numbers of complaints. 
 
Where an NHRI does not play a role in ADR (or complaints-handling more generally), in our 
view, it is important that it has close ties with the institution(s) that do. Similarly, NHRIs that 
are structured as an umbrella body composed of two or more institutions, one of which 
provides ADR such as an ombudsperson may require internal links. This would include 
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referring complaints to that body as well as trying to work with it to try to strengthen its 
mandate and effectiveness in dealing with human rights complaints.106  For example, the 
Northern Irish Human Rights Commission does not have a complaints-handling function but 
has worked closely with the Northern Irish Ombudsman to train it and develop a human 
rights-based approach to its complaints-handling.107 It would also include devising a system 
of complaints-analysis so that the NHRI could address the wider systemic issues arising from 
individual complaints. Equally, training and capacity-building may not be enough and a 
general ombudsperson or an agreement-based ADR process may still require human rights 
specialists.  
 
The arguments set out here demonstrate that there is no correct answer about the type of 
institution within which an ADR function for human rights complaints should sit as there are 
advantages and risks on both sides. These advantages and risks may also weigh differently in 
different jurisdictions. The key issues however are to ensure that the institution has sufficient 
resources to provide an effective ADR service for human rights complaints. This may require 
the investment of additional financial resource as well as new staff with different skills (for 
the ombudsperson, human rights experts and for the NHRI, ADR experts). In both situations, 
a critical additional component would be to include resource, expertise and a process to 
monitor and map the types of human rights complaints that are made against what is known 
from other sources about the human rights situation in the state and to ensure that they are 
documented and publicly accounted for.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have sought to provide a framework for decision-making on whether ADR 
can and should be used to resolve human rights disputes. Our starting point is that 
engagement with ADR should be voluntary and not seek to undermine or interfere with the 
duty to investigate allegations of human rights violations, where that duty applies. From 
there, we suggest that certain forms of ADR may have a valuable role to play in resolving 
human rights complaints, depending on the characteristics of the process and the objectives in 
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resolving the dispute. This is particularly the case where parties have an interest in exercising 
autonomy and pursuing more creative remedies than may be available in court as well as 
offering scope for dealing with systemic issues. However, in our view, even where the form 
of ADR aligns with the objective(s) of resolving a particular dispute, the use of the process 
should be conditional on substantive and procedural standards of justice being embedded 
within the process. As noted in the article, this is a key area in need of greater reflection and 
attention if ADR is to play an effective role in resolving human rights disputes. These 
standards of justice, however, should not seek to conflate a particular ADR process with 
courts but rather develop a model that fits the nature of the process. 
 
Institutionalisation of ADR may offer the best prospects for the development of standards of 
justice as well as enhancing the prospects for systemic human rights issues to be identified 
and addressed in addition to facilitating individual’s right to a remedy and reparation. The 
article underscores that care must be taken to ensure that institutional provision of ADR does 
not turn into a de facto mandatory process. In many ways the institution can drive this by 
being reflexive about the strengths and limitations of its process and identifying where other 
services (including the courts) are preferable and where gaps remain. However, an 
institution’s ability to do this is heavily dependent on its resources. Further questions also 
arise about whether an institution should be specialised in human rights, such as an NHRI, or 
a more general dispute resolution body. In principle, a specialist human rights organisation 
may offer particular benefits, including on systemic issues. However, as we note in the 
article, it is rare that these questions will be asked in a context with no existing institutions so 
in reality, whether a body like an NHRI should offer this role depends, in part, on other 
institutions that operate within the particular jurisdiction. This in turn impacts on the other 
functions that the body is expected to undertake, functions which are increasing in breadth 
and not necessarily matched with additional resources. Therefore, the central question will be 
whether an institution exists that can offer effective ADR for human rights bearing in mind 
the considerable resource this will entail. 
 
